

Temporal Network Creation Games

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Algorithmic Aspects of Temporal Graphs VI

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Temporal Network Creation Games

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Temporal Network Creation Games

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TEMPORAL REACHABILITY PROBLEM

[Kempe, Kleinberg, and Kumar, JCSS 2002]


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NETWORK CREATION GAMES

First paper in AGT [Fabrikant, Luthra, Maneva, Papadimitriou, Shenker, PODC 2003]

Afterwards, many other models were defined and studied

Temporal Graphs



A temporal graph
with lifetime $t = 3$


Temporal graph H with lifetime $t \in \mathbb{N}$:

1. undirected graph with n vertices
2. each edge e has an integer time label $\lambda(e) \in [t]$

(non-strict) temporal path from v to u in H : A path from v to u with monotonically non-decreasing time labels (u is **temporally reachable** from v)

Temporally connected graph: A temporal graph H that contains a temporal path from v to u , for every ordered pair (v, u) of vertices v, u of H

Temporal Reachability Network Creation Game



- Complete temporal host graph H with lifetime t
- vertices of H are selfish agents

HOW THE AGENTS FORM A NETWORK


- agent v buys a set of edges S_v incident to her
- Let $S = \langle S_v \rangle_v$ be the strategy profile
- $\cup_v S_v$ are the edges of the formed network $G(S)$

THE COST FUNCTION EACH AGENT WANTS TO MINIMIZE

- U_v : set of vertices that are NOT temporally reachable from v in $G(S)$
- penalty of $K > 1$ for each unreached vertex

$$\text{cost}(v, S) = |S_v| + K \cdot |U_v|$$

Temporal Reachability Network Creation Game



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$$\text{cost}(v, S) = |S_v| + K \cdot |U_v|$$

$G(S)$ is a **stable** if $\text{cost}(v, S) \leq \text{cost}(v, (S_{-v}, S'_v))$ for every agent v and for every alternative strategy S'_v for agent v .

Important questions in NCGs

- Analyzing the EXISTENCE of STABLE NETWORKS
 - **QUESTION 1:** Does the game always admit stable networks?
- Understanding the COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY aspects of the game
 - **QUESTION 2:** Is agent x playing a best response?
 - **QUESTION 3:** Is the network formed by the agents stable?
- Analyzing the QUALITY of STABLE NETWORKS
 - **QUESTION 4:** What is the *Price of Anarchy* of the game?

Price of Anarchy: worst-case ratio between social cost of stable networks vs social cost of optimum solution, where social cost of S is equal to $\sum_v cost(v, S)$

Trivial results (lifetime $t = 1$)

| | |
|--|--------------------|
| QUESTION 1: Does the game always admit stable networks? | YES |
| QUESTION 2: Is agent x playing a best response? | in P |
| QUESTION 3: Is the network formed by the agents stable? | in P |
| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | 1 (spanning trees) |

Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)


| | |
|--|--|
| QUESTION 1: Does the game always admit stable networks? | |
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EXISTENCE of STABLE NETWORKS


- **QUESTION 1:** Does the game always admit stable networks?
- **FIRST ATTEMPT:** Is the game a *potential game*?

QUESTION 1: Does the game always admit stable networks?

THEOREM: The Temporal Reachability NCG is NOT a potential game.




Detail to guarantee temporal connectivity



QUESTION 1: Does the game always admit stable networks?

THEOREM: Complete host graphs with lifetime $t = 2$ always contain a stable network.

PROOF: There is always a spanning tree whose edges all have the same time label.



Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)


| | |
|--|--|
| QUESTION 1: Does the game always admit stable networks? | YES for $t = 2$ OPEN for $t \geq 3$ not a potential game |
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| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | |

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY

- **QUESTION 2:** Is agent x playing a best response?
- **QUESTION 3:** Is the network formed by the agents stable?

QUESTION 2: Is agent x playing a best response?

THEOREM: Computing a best response of agent x is NP-hard even for complete host graphs with lifetime $t = 2$.



Missing edges all have time label 2


SET COVER PROBLEM INSTANCE:

- Universe $U = \{u_1, u_2, u_3, u_4, u_5\}$
- Sets: $M_1 = \{u_1, u_2\}$, $M_2 = \{u_1, u_2, u_4\}$, $M_3 = \{u_3, u_5\}$

Computing a best response for x is equivalent to solving the SET COVER PROBLEM INSTANCE.

QUESTION 3: Is the network formed by the agents stable?

THEOREM: Deciding whether the network formed by the agents is stable is NP-complete even for complete host graphs with lifetime $t = 3$.



Missing edges all have time label 3

Given a SET COVER PROBLEM INSTANCE + SOLUTION, deciding whether there is a better solution is NP-complete.

SET COVER PROBLEM INSTANCE

- Universe $U = \{u_1, u_2, u_3, u_4, u_5\}$
- Sets: $M_1 = \{u_1, u_2\}$, $M_2 = \{u_1, u_2, u_4\}$, $M_3 = \{u_3, u_5\}$

+

- SOLUTION $\{M_2, M_3\}$

Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)

| | |
|--|--|
| QUESTION 1: Does the game always admit stable networks? | YES for $t = 2$ OPEN for $t \geq 3$ not a potential game |
| QUESTION 2: Is agent x playing a best response? | NP-hard |
| QUESTION 3: Is the network formed by the agents stable? | NP-hard for $t \geq 3$ |
| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | |




QUALITY of STABLE NETWORKS

- **QUESTION 4:** What is the Price of Anarchy of the game?

Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)

| | |
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| QUESTION 2: Is agent x playing a best response? | NP-hard |
| QUESTION 3: Is the network formed by the agents stable? | NP-hard for $t \geq 3$ |
| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | $\Omega(\log n)$ |



temporally connected 3-d hypercube

Kempe, Kleinberg, and Kumar [JCSS 2002] constructed a temporally connected $\log n$ -dimensional hypercube with lifetime $t = \log n$ that is minimal.


- $G(S)$ is the temporal $\log n$ -dimensional hypercube
 - missing edges all have the same time label of $1 + \log n$
- LEMMA:** $G(S)$ is stable.

QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game?


THEOREM: Size of stable networks is $\leq t(n - 1)$, where t is the lifetime of host graph.

PROOF: The subgraph G_l of a stable network $G(S)$ formed by edges of time label l is a forest.


A stable network $G(S)$




G_1



G_2



G_3



Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)

| | |
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| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | $\Omega(\log n)$ $\leq t$ |

QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game?

THE CONCEPT OF NECESSARY EDGE IN STABLE NETWORKS


Agent v buys an edge e because e is **necessary** for v to temporally reach some u in $G(S)$.

THEOREM: If $G(S)$ contains $\omega(n\sqrt{n})$ edges, then it is not stable.

PROOF: A counting argument shows that the forbidden structure appears.

Forbidden structure that never appears in stable networks

Label edge e bought by v with $[u]$
if e is necessary for v to reach u



One of the two agents v_1 and v_2 can delete an edge

Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)



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| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | $\Omega(\log n)$ $\leq \min\{t, O(\sqrt{n})\}$ |

A hand-drawn scroll with a light beige background and a dark outline. The scroll is partially unrolled, with the top and bottom edges curled. The text "Extensions to GREEDY agents" is written in a simple, black, sans-serif font in the center of the scroll. The word "GREEDY" is in all caps.

Extensions to
GREEDY agents

The model of GREEDY agent

A greedy stable network
which is not stable



Introduced by [Lenzner, WINE 2012] to avoid hardness of computing best responses.

Strategy allowed to a **greedy** agent v in $G(S)$

- Add an edge incident to v to S_v
- Delete an edge from S_v
- Swap an edge (one deletion + one addition)

$G(S)$ is **greedy stable** if no greedy agent can be better off by performing a greedy move.

greedy stable networks

stable networks

Our results (for lifetime $t \geq 2$)


| | Selfish agents | Greedy agents |
|--|--|--|
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| QUESTION 2: Is agent x playing a best response? | NP-hard | in P |
| QUESTION 3: Is the network formed by the agents stable? | NP-hard for $t \geq 3$ | In P |
| QUESTION 4: What is the Price of Anarchy of the game? | $\Omega(\log n)$ $\leq \min\{t, O(\sqrt{n})\}$ | $\Omega(\log n)$ $\leq \min\{t, O(\sqrt{n})\}$ |

Summary and Open Problems

- **MAIN NOVELTY:** We combined Temporal Graphs with Network Creation Games
- We provided some results for Temporal Reachability Network Creation Game

OPEN PROBLEMS

1. **QUESTION 1:** Does the game always admit stable networks?
 - **CONJECTURE:** Yes
2. **QUESTION 4:** What is the Price of Anarchy of the game?
 - **CONJECTURE:** Stable networks are sparse
3. Study other Temporal Network Creation Games



Thanks for your attention